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You're Sick? You're Fired! The Case for Eliminating
COBRA's Gross Misconduct Exception
Nora Fitzgerald
Olsten Corporation hired Pamela Cabral in November
1987.1 In September 1992, while still employed by Olsten,
Cabral began seven months of treatment for breast cancer. 2 In
February 1993, Cabral received a six percent raise and ex-
panded job responsibilities. 3 Just six months later, Olsten ter-
minated Cabral for "gross misconduct,"4 and she therefore lost
her eligibility for continued health care coverage under Title X of
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
("COBRA). 5 A Florida federal court issued a preliminary in-
1. Cabral v. Olsten Corp., 843 F. Supp. 701, 702 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
2. Id. See Ridgely Ochs, A Search for Answers; What We Know; 50 Ques-
tions and Answers, NEWSDAY, Dec. 27, 1994, at B03 (summarizing "what we
have learned" about breast cancer). Breast cancer is typically treated locally to
kill or remove cancer in a specific area, or systemically to kill cancer throughout
the body. Id. Local treatments include surgery and radiation therapy; systemic
treatments include chemotherapy and hormonal therapy. Id. Most cases of
breast cancer require some form of surgery, and many require systemic treat-
ment, depending on the stage of the cancer and the patient's age. Id. Radiation
therapy produces numerous side effects, including fatigue and sharp, shooting
pains in the breast. Id. Chemotherapy also produces numerous side effects,
including nausea, loss of appetite, hair loss, risk of infection, bleeding, anemia,
fatigue, and changes in the menstrual cycle. Id.
3. Cabral, 843 F. Supp. at 702.
4. Id. On August 6, 1993, Cabral met with her manager regarding her
continued employment with Olsten. Id. The discussion concerned her loyalty
to Olsten and her "listless" performance. Id. At that time, Olsten offered her
two months commission and two weeks of severance pay. Id. During her exit
interview on August 9, 1993, it became apparent that Cabral believed she had
been discharged, while her manager believed that she had resigned. Id. After
further discussion, Olsten indicated that Cabral could continue her employ-
ment subject to a 30-day probationary period. Id. On August 10, 1993, how-
ever, Olsten restated that Cabral had been terminated. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 10,001-10,003, 100 Stat. 82, 222-37 (1986) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
"COBRA" refers to Title X of the Act, which requires an employer that employs
more than 20 employees and sponsors a group health plan to offer covered em-
ployees and qualified beneficiaries continued health care coverage in certain
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
junction preventing Olsten from denying COBRA coverage to
Cabral until the case could be decided on the merits.6
Cabral emphasizes a critical flaw in COBRA. As one of the
federal government's strongest efforts to increase access to
health care coverage, 7 COBRA mandates that employees and
circumstances, including termination of employment. See infra notes 14-25 and
accompanying text (discussing COBRA's statutory requirements).
6. Cabral, 843 F. Supp. at 702. The grant of the injunction may suggest
that the court believed Olsten terminated Cabral to avoid providing her health
benefits. Expert Considers Recent Cases on the Use of the Gross Misconduct
Exception, COBRA Guide Connections (CCH) No. 19, at 2 (Sept. 22, 1994) (dis-
cussing Cabral with Roberta Casper Watson, Chair Elect of the ABA Section of
Taxation's Employee Benefits Committee). Olsten alleged that Cabral filed
false mileage reports, failed to attend two mandatory meetings, and received an
unsolicited offer of employment. Id. While filing false mileage reports "would
probably be grounds for gross misconduct termination," Watson notes that the
court "obviously didn't believe" these allegations. Id. "The picture one gets
from reading the opinion is of a woman who had breast cancer who's valiantly
trying to keep working despite all the chemotherapy treatments and she misses
a couple of meetings, which are classified as mandatory meetings, because she's
sick." Id. Watson states, "I don't know anything except what's in the opinion,
but that picture may explain the judge's grant of a preliminary injunction forc-
ing the employer to offer her COBRA until the end of the case." Id. at 3.
7. As originally proposed in January 1985, COBRA targeted "women and
their dependent children who have been previously covered [by an employer-
sponsored group health plan] but, due to a change in family status suddenly
find themselves uninsured." 131 CONG. REc. E53-01 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985)
(statement of Rep. Stark). By mandating that former employers continue to
provide health care coverage to employees, COBRA represents a major step to-
ward national health care reform. Thomas H. Somers, COBRA: An Incremen-
tal Approach to National Health Insurance, 5 J. CONTEmP. HEALTH L. & Poi'y
141, 142-43 (1989) ("Despite widely accepted assumptions" that Republican ad-
ministrations oppose governmental intervention in the workplace, "it was dur-
ing Ronald Reagan's watch that government, through COBRA, engineered an
incremental and complex regulatory approach to facilitate affordable access to
health care."). See also RONALD REAGAN, STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, H.R.
Doc. No. 141, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1986) (directing Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Dr. Otis Bowen, to develop "recommendations on how the pri-
vate sector and Government can work together to address the problems of af-
fordable insurance for those whose life savings would otherwise be threatened
when catastrophic illness strikes"); 133 CONG. REc. E1775-02 (daily ed. May 6,
1987) (statement of Rep. Gradison) (discussing President Reagan's efforts to re-
kindle "the congressional commitment" to catastrophic health care coverage);
Moratorium Proposal Treats Symptoms, Not Disease, Walker Says, Pension
Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1185 (July 25, 1988) ("Continuation of health care provi-
sions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 were part
of an incremental approach to solving the problem of the nation's uninsured,
according to Charles N. Kahn I, minority health counsel for the House Ways
and Means Committee."); Is COBRA Really The First In A Series of Mandatory
Benefits?, SPENCER'S RES. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENE FTs, Aug. 14, 1987, at 3
(quoting former congressman John Erlenborn, who explains that "mandated
benefits are becoming more interesting to Congress because the costs are as-
[Vol. 80:197
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
their family members be given the option of continuing em-
ployer-provided health care coverage in specific circumstances.8
Although Congress designed COBRA to increase access to
health care, it specifically excluded coverage for employees ter-
minated for gross misconduct.9 Neither the original statute,
subsequent amendments, nor proposed regulations, however,
define "gross misconduct."' 0
COBRA's vague gross misconduct exception creates serious
inconsistencies in the administration and interpretation of its
federally-mandated benefit provisions. The regulatory agencies
charged with COBRA's enforcement offer little guidance on the
issue and little assistance to individuals who believe that they
sumed by the private sector rather than the government."); Peter Osterlund,
Congress Begins Work on Priority Health and Welfare Legislation, THE C-nis-
TIAN ScI. MONITOR, June 12, 1987, at 5 (discussing congressional efforts to im-
plement a catastrophic health care program for the elderly).
Although nearly ten years have passed since Congress enacted COBRA,
legislators continue to recognize COBRA's effectiveness in ensuring access to
health care benefits. See Legislation Proposed To Expand COBRA, COBRA
Guide Connections (CCH) No. 29, at 1 (July 29, 1995). As introduced by Sena-
tor Alphonse D'Amato, The Health Insurance Portability and Guaranteed Re-
newability Act of 1995 (S. 715) would extend COBRA mandates to all employers
with two or more employees. Id. The current statute only applies to employers
with 20 or more employees. Id. The bill would also extend the COBRA continu-
ation period from 18 months to 36 months and prevent employers from termi-
nating continuation coverage for qualified employees who become covered
under another group health plan unless the other coverage is "substantially
similar to COBRA coverage." Id. In contrast, the current statute allows em-
ployers to terminate COBRA continuation benefits as long as the other group
health plan does not place any limits or exclusions on pre-existing conditions.
Id. Finally, the proposed legislation would eliminate the requirement that em-
ployers provide qualified beneficiaries with the same benefits as active employ-
ees, allowing employers to choose identical coverage, identical coverage with a
$1,000 annual deductible, or identical coverage with a $3,000 annual deducti-
ble. Id.
8. See infra note 18 and accompanying text (describing situations in
which COBRA extends coverage for former employees).
9. See infra notes 44-49 (describing uncertainty surrounding the gross
misconduct standard).
10. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4402, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-161 to -164 (1990);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 6701-6703,
103 Stat. 2106, 2294-96 (1989); Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3011, 102 Stat. 3342, 3616-24 (1988); Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1895(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2936-40 (1986); Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9501, 100 Stat.
1874, 2075-78 (1986); see also infra notes 45-46 (discussing Congress's failure to
define the gross misconduct exception).
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have been incorrectly denied COBRA continuation.1' A number
of courts have interpreted the gross misconduct exception nar-
rowly, ordering COBRA continuation coverage for employees
terminated for alleged gross misconduct. 12 Other courts and
commentators disagree over what actions, if any, constitute
gross misconduct for purposes of COBRA administration. 13
This Note examines evolving interpretations of COBRA's
gross misconduct exception. Part I provides an overview of CO-
BRA, including its specific mandates and legislative history case
law. Part IE describes different definitions of gross misconduct
adopted by the federal district courts. Part IHI evaluates the
legal reasoning of the district courts and demonstrates the
shortcomings of COBRA's ambiguous gross misconduct provi-
sion. This Note proposes that Congress give effect to legislative
purpose by eliminating COBRA's gross misconduct exception.
In the absence of such congressional action, the Note argues
that courts should construe the gross misconduct exception very
narrowly, denying coverage in only the most egregious cases of
employee misconduct.
11. See infra part I.A2 (explaining that the Department of Labor, the In-
ternal Revenue Service, and the Department of Health and Human Services
share responsibility for COBRA's enforcement).
12. See, e.g., Cabral v. Olsten Corp. 843 F. Supp. 701, 702 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(granting injunctive relief preventing employer from denying COBRA continua-
tion benefits to employee who was terminated for alleged gross misconduct);
Paris v. F. Korbel & Bros., 751 F. Supp. 834, 839 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that
breach of an employer's confidentiality policy does not constitute gross miscon-
duct); see also infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing evolving
interpretations of gross misconduct).
13. See infra part II (discussing recent decisions addressing the gross mis-
conduct issue); see also Bruno v. United Steelworkers, 784 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D.
Ohio 1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1993). In Bruno, the employer
claimed that the employee "failed to attend required safety instructional meet-
ings on two occasions. . ., lied to his supervisor concerning his attendance and
was loafing while he should have been attending the training session." Id. at
1292. An arbitrator found that when questioned about his behavior, the em-
ployee called his supervisor "a 'Hitler,' a 'Communist' and a 'Nazi.'" Id. at 1295.
Although the employee attended a make-up training session, he was disruptive
and refused to participate in the program. Id. at 1292. When he entered the
training room, he asked the trainer, "Do I have to watch this piece of shit?," and
refused to sign an attendance sheet. Id. at 1295. The case did not concern CO-
BRA, however, because although the company fired the employee for these ac-
tions, it did not even attempt to deny him continuation coverage. See Roberta
C. Watson, COBRA Health Continuation Benefits, in ALI-ABA EMPLOYEE RE_
TIREMENT AND WELFARE PLANS OF TAx-ExEmT AND GovERNmENTAL EMPLOYERS




I. OVERVIEW OF CONTINUED HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE AND GROSS MISCONDUCT
UNDER COBRA
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Under COBRA, private employers and state and local gov-
ernment employers 14 with more than twenty employees1 5 that
sponsor a group health plan' 6 must offer covered employees' 7
and qualified beneficiaries the option of continuing health care
coverage in certain circumstances, including death, divorce,
legal separation, or termination of employment.' 8 COBRA clas-
sifies the employee's spouse and dependent children on the day
14. Title X outlines health insurance continuation requirements for private
employers; Title XXI establishes similar health insurance continuation re-
quirements for state and local employers. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, 222-37, 232-37
(1986).
15. The statute establishes the following requirements:
(a) In general
The plan sponsor of each group health plan shall provide, in ac-
cordance with this part, that each qualified beneficiary who would lose
coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is entitled,
under the plan, to elect, within the election period, continuation cover-
age under the plan.
(b) Exception for certain plans
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any group health
plan for any calendar year if all employers maintaining such plan nor-
mally employed fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day
during the preceding calendar year.
29 U.S.C. § 1161(a)-(b) (1988).
16. Under COBRA, a "group health plan" is any employee welfare benefit
plan providing medical care to covered employees or qualified beneficiaries, di-
rectly or through insurance or reimbursement. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(1) (1988).
17. A "covered employee" is any individual who is-or was-covered under
a group health plan due to his or her employment or previous employment with
an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(2) (1988).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1163 (1988). The specific circumstances in which
coverage may be continued are known as "qualifying events." These events
include:
any of the following events which, but for required continuation cover-
age required under this part, would result in the loss of coverage of a
qualified beneficiary:
(1) The death of the covered employee.
(2) The termination (other than by reason of such employee's gross
misconduct), or reduction of hours, of the covered employee's
employment.
(3) The divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the
employee's spouse.
(4) The covered employee becoming entitled to benefits under title
XVIH of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.].
(5) A dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the gener-
ally applicable requirements of the plan.
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before the qualifying event as qualified beneficiaries. 19 The cov-
ered employee is also a qualified beneficiary under COBRA if the
employee loses coverage due to termination or reduction in
hours of employment.20 A qualified beneficiary may elect to con-
tinue coverage up to sixty days after receiving notice of his or
her COBRA rights.21
Continuation coverage periods under COBRA vary for dif-
ferent classes of beneficiaries. Coverage continues for up to
eighteen months for terminated or under-employed employees
and their family members.22 Coverage continues for up to three
years for spouses and dependents who lose employer coverage
because of divorce or legal separation, Medicare entitlement, or
the employee's death, and for dependents who no longer meet
(6) A proceeding in a case under title 11, commencing on or after July
1, 1986, with respect to the employer from whose employment the cov-
ered employee retired at any time.
29 U.S.C. § 1163 (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(3)(A) (1988).
20. As originally proposed, COBRA limited continuation to women and de-
pendent children who lost coverage under employer-sponsored health plans.
Legislators eventually expanded the bill's scope to include employees and fam-
ily members. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (discussing CO-
BRA's legislative history).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1165 (1988). See also 52 Fed. Reg. 22,729 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed June 15, 1987) (outlining the notification pro-
cess). The notification process is cumbersome and time-consuming. Generally,
the employer or plan administrator determines whether a qualifying event has
occurred without receiving notification from the qualified beneficiary. Id. Indi-
viduals who lose coverage due to divorce, legal separation, or loss of "dependent
child" status, however, must notify the plan administrator that they have ex-
perienced a qualifying event. Id. Within fourteen days of receiving notice of the
qualifying event, the plan administrator must notify each qualified beneficiary
in writing of his or her right to elect continuation coverage. COMERCE
CLEARINGHOUSE, INC., COBRA GUIDE 4100 (1993). Plan administrators must
track the choices of numerous beneficiaries. Further complications arise be-
cause qualified beneficiaries can change their COBRA elections throughout the
60-day notification period. Id. In 1987, the Department of Labor issued a
"Model Notice" for employers to use when informing employees of COBRA con-
tinuation rights, Fed. Reg. 605 (1987), but has not updated it to reflect subse-
quent amendments to COBRA. COBRA GUIDE, supra, 4110. Employers that
continue to use the "model" language are thus not advising employees of their
actual continuation rights under COBRA. Not surprisingly, nearly one-third of
respondents to a 1992 survey reported that their most costly COBRA adminis-
trative expense involves notifying beneficiaries of their rights. Nearly One-
Third of Plans Call Notification Most Costly COBRA Expense, Pension Rep.
(BNA) No. 39, at 1716 (Oct. 5, 1992). See generally COBRA GUIDE, supra, 1
4100-5060 (detailing notification requirements and providing sample notices).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1162 (2)(A)(i) (1988). This 18-month continuation period is
extended to 29 months for certain employees with Medicare disabilities. 29
U.S.C. § 1162 (2)(A)(v) (1989).
202 [Vol. 80:197
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the requirements for dependent coverage under the employer's
group health plan.2 3 COBRA continuation coverage ends, how-
ever, if a qualified beneficiary gains coverage under another
group health plan during the required coverage period.24 Addi-
tionally, many states have enacted continuation laws that sup-
plement or extend federal COBRA coverage. 25
1. Cost to Employers
COBRA extends health care benefits to a large portion of
the population at no cost to the federal government.26 Qualified
beneficiaries pay the cost of continued group health coverage
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1162 (2)(A)(iv) (1988). If any of these events occurs after
the employee terminates employment or becomes underemployed, the em-
ployee's spouse and dependents may be eligible to extend the 18-month continu-
ation period to 36 months. 29 U.S.C. § 1162 (2)(A)(ii) (1988). Retirees who lose
coverage due to certain bankruptcy proceedings can continue health care cover-
age for themselves and their family members for life; upon the death of the
employee, surviving family members are eligible for an additional 36 months of
COBRA continuation. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(A)(2)(iii) (1988).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988). There is one exception to this rule: if the em-
ployee's new health plan limits coverage for a pre-existing condition, he or she
may elect COBRA continuation for that condition. See Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6701, 103 Stat. 2106, 2294 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1377 (1990); Aiuc CODE ANN. § 23-
86-114 (Michie 1992); CAL. INs. CODE §§ 10116.5, 11512.03, 11512.1, 12692
(West 1988 & West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.62 (West
1990); CAL. LAn. CODE § 2807.5 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-16-
108(1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), (2)(a)-(d), (3)(a)-(c) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
538 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-24-21.2 (1990 & Supp. 1995); HAw. REv.
STAT. §8 393-11 to -33 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-2201 to -2219 (1991 & Supp.
1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5, §§ 367.2, 367b, 367e (Smith-Hurd 1993
& Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-19 (Burns 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 509B.3-.5 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2209 (Supp. 1994);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.18-110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22:215.7, 215.13 (West 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2809-A
(West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 490G-I (1994); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 9,
§ 61.14 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAws cl. 175, §§ 110D, 1l0G-I (Law. Co-op. 1987 &
Supp. 1995): MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 500.2264 (West 1993); MN. STAT.
§§ 62A.146, 62A.16-.17, 62A.20-.21 (1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-51 (Supp.
1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.428, 376.893 (1991 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-22-503 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1640 to -1645 (1993 & Supp.
1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 8§ 689B.0345, 689B.245-.249 (Michie 1993); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. 8§ 415:18 (IV)(a), 415:18 (VII)(g)(1)-(4) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59A-18-16 (Michie 1995); N.Y. INs. Aw § 3221(m) (McKinney Supp. 1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-53-5 (1994); N.D. CFNT. CODE § 26.1-36-23 (1989); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.38 (Anderson 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2312
(1994); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.. art. 3.51-6 (West Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 632.897 (West 1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 26-19-113, 26-22-401 (1991 & Supp.
1995).
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that COBRA rep-
resents a major step toward national health care reform).
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and employers may charge up to 102% of the actual premium to
cover administrative costs. 27 While COBRA coverage costs par-
ticipants more than the company-subsidized coverage offered to
active employees, 28 it generally costs them less than policies
from individual health insurers.29
COBRA's financing, however, poses problems for both em-
ployers and qualified beneficiaries. Administrative costs typi-
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3)(A) (1988).
28. The majority of employer-sponsored health care plans require employ-
ees to pay a portion of the cost of coverage. FOSTER IniINs, NATIONAL SuRVEY
OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS 18 (1994) (reporting average employee
contributions for health care coverage). In 1994, 73% of survey respondents
that offered traditional indemnity health plans required employees to contrib-
ute to the cost of single health care coverage, and more than 84% required em-
ployees to contribute to the cost of family health care coverage. Id. A 1994
survey found that the average annual premium for COBRA beneficiaries was
$5,854 per participant-nearly $2,000 higher than the average annual pre-
mium for active employees. 1994 COBRA Survey: One in Five Eligible Employ-
ees Takes COBRA; Employers Pay One-Third, SPENCER'S RES. REP. ON
EMPLOYE BENEFITS, Aug. 19, 1994, at 1, 2 [hereinafter 1994 COBRA Survey].
These totals include both claim and administration costs. Id. Average monthly
COBRA premiums have increased dramatically since 1989:







Id. The survey reported that employers are subsidizing the claims cost of CO-
BRA continuation coverage by an average of 32%, and that predicting COBRA
costs for an individual company in a specific year "is practically impossible." Id.
at 3.
29. JERRY S. ROSENBLOOm, THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 77
(1988). Unlike group insurance, which covers an entire group without requir-
ing medical examinations or evidence of insurability, individual insurance ex-
amines the risk associated with each life. Id. For example, a 45-year-old man
with a history of high blood pressure would typically pay lower premiums for
group health coverage than for individual health coverage. See Leslie P. Fran-
cis, Consumer Expectations andAccess to Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1881,
1911 (1992) ("The idea of COBRA is to allow discharged employees to receive
insurance more cheaply, because they continue to participate in the risk pool of
their employer's group plan."); Henry Gilgoff, COBRA Helps to Fill Insurance
Gap but Laid-Off Workers Must Pick Up the Tab, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1989, at
53, 53 (quoting an insurance company official who finds "that many who are
eligible take insurance available under COBRA because the alternatives for
anything approaching comparable coverage are'likely to cost substantially
more"). But see 1994 COBRA Survey, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that "the low
incidence of COBRA elections in any one company makes COBRA operate much
more like individual health insurance than like group insurance.").
204
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cally exceed two percent of the total premium,30 and many self-
funded 31 employers report that COBRA claims exceed the dollar
value of COBRA premiums.32 Unlike most group health plans,
which limit coverage for pre-existing conditions,3 3 COBRA cov-
ers all medical conditions, and thus appeals to individuals with
existing illnesses.34 Healthy individuals, in contrast, often
either risk going without coverage or qualify for less expensive
30. One survey found that COBRA administrative costs range from $36 per
continuee per year to $339 per continuee per year. 1994 COBRA Survey, supra
note 28, at 3. More than 80% of the 876 multi-employer plan administrators
who responded to another survey reported that they calculated COBRA premi-
ums at 102% of the applicable premium-the maximum allowed by COBRA.
COBRA Administration Proves Costly for Multiemployer Plans, SPENCER'S REs.
REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITs, Oct. 9, 1992, at 6. More than 40% of the respon-
dents reported that the actual costs of administering COBRA exceeded 2% of
the applicable premium. Id.
31. A "self-funded" employer funds the company-sponsored medical plan by
paying claims directly or through a third-party administrator, rather than pay-
ing premiums to an insurance company. See ROSENBLOOM, supra note 29, at
419 (explaining that self-funded employers retain "total and ultimate responsi-
bility for providing all plan benefits"). While self-funded arrangements give
companies greater control over cash flows and reduced exposure to certain taxes
and regulations, they also require the employer to bear considerable financial
risk when claim costs exceed premiums. See id. at 418-21. In addition, many
employers have faced litigation when taking advantage of an ERISA provision
exempting self-funded multi-state employers from state laws regulating em-
ployee benefit plans. See generally David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in the Rehn-
quist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 945, 957-68 (1991) (discussing the evolution of
the ERISA preemption under the Rehnquist Court); George L. Flint, ERISA:
Nonwaivability of Preemption, 39 KAN. L. REv. 297, 303-08 (1991) (discussing
ERISA preemption in the context of litigation over benefits claims by employee-
beneficiaries).
32. The average COBRA beneficiary maintains coverage for three months
and incurs claims 33% to 100% higher than claims of active employees. See
Nam Calls for National Plan to Improve the Quality of Care, Pension Rep.
(BNA) No. 25, at 1049 (June 24, 1991). Average COBRA cash claims and re-
serve increases exceeded COBRA premiums by 17% in 1990 and 21% in 1991.
FoSTER HIGGINS, 1991 HEALTH CARE BENEFrTs SURvEY 20 (1992). For 39% of
employers in the 1991 survey, expenses exceeded premiums by 50% or more.
Id. More than half the survey respondents could not track their COBRA ex-
penses in 1991. Id. at 19. See supra note 28 (discussing the average cost of
coverage for COBRA employees and beneficiaries).
33. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 29, at 179.
34. One survey concluded that
[s]even full years of continuation of coverage statistics clearly indicate
that COBRA participants are sick and have higher claims costs than
active employees. Given the high premiums for COBRA, the trend of
sicker beneficiaries choosing coverage is not surprising. As should
have been predicted from the start, the 2% differential allowed for ad-
ministration expenses for COBRA does not offset the significant differ-
ences in claims cost.
1994 COBRA Survey, supra note 28, at 3.
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coverage through other sources.3 5 Despite these problems, the
number of individuals who elect to extend coverage continues to
increase.3 6
2. Regulatory Scheme
Congress codified COBRA's continuation provisions in three
locations: the Employee Income Retirement Security Act ("ER-
ISA"), 3 7 the Internal Revenue Code,38 and the Public Health
Service Act.3 9  Congress divided regulatory responsibilities
among the Department of Labor ("DOL"), which oversees the no-
tification and reporting requirements; the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS"), which oversees regulations regarding required
coverage, deductions, and income inclusions; and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, which oversees the re-
quirement that state and local governments provide COBRA
continuation to qualified beneficiaries. 40
Each department imposes its own sanctions for non-compli-
ance.4 1 The IRS has jurisdiction over the gross misconduct ex-
ception; employers that deny COBRA benefits to terminated
employees who are not guilty of gross misconduct face an excise
tax of $100 per beneficiary per day, with a maximum penalty of
$200 per day per family.42 The tax does not apply if the em-
35. See Henry Gilgoff, COBRA Helps to Fill Insurance Gap but Laid-Off
Workers Must Pick Up the Tab, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1989, at 53 (reporting that
COBRA premiums can be "so steep compared with the amounts workers are
accustomed to under group employment plans that some of those workers just
don't buy the coverage"). But see supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting
that COBRA premiums are still lower than premiums for comparable individ-
ual health insurance coverage).
36. In 1990, more than 20% of individuals eligible for continuation cover-
age under COBRA actually took the health care coverage offered-almost twice
the percentage choosing coverage in 1989. Employers Face Increasing Costs,
Compliance Difficulties, Finds Third Annual COBRA Survey, SPENCF_'S REs.
REP. ON EMPLOYE BENEFnTs, July 20, 1990, at 3. In 1994, more eligible indi-
viduals chose COBRA continuation coverage than in any previous year. 1994
COBRA Survey, supra note 28, at 4.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 162(k) (1988).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-1 (1988).
40. See H.R. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 562-63 (1985).
41. See William Kennedy, The COBRA Strikes at Group Health Insurance
Plans, 92 Dira. L. REv. 253, 259 (1987) (outlining sanctions provided by each
area of federal law amended by COBRA).
42. See COBRA GUIDE, supra note 21, 220 (describing noncompliance
penalties under COBRA). While these penalties may seem harsh, they are
much more lenient than the penalties in the original legislation. See COBRA
Noncompliance Penalties So Severe That IRS Can Legislate "Gotcha" by Regula-
tion, SPENCER'S RES. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Nov. 21, 1987, at 1; see also
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ployer violated the statute for reasonable cause rather than will-
ful neglect, and if the employer corrects the violation within
thirty days.43
B. GROSS MISCONDUCT EXCEPTION
Although COBRA denies continuation rights to employees
who are terminated for "gross misconduct,"4" Congress has not
defined this term in the original statute, accompanying regula-
tions,45 or subsequent amendments. 46 Congress's silence with
respect to the gross misconduct exception has provoked debate
over what actions constitute gross misconduct for purposes of
COBRA administration,47 and more important, over when and
whether employers should deny COBRA continuation for gross
misconduct.48 Because most litigated cases involve individuals
Sanctions for COBRA Violations Softened by Technical Corrections, SPENCER'S
Rus. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS, Nov. 4, 1988, at 3 (reporting that the Techni-
cal and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, "softens the sanctions for employ-
ers who fail to comply with the COBRA continuation of coverage
requirements").
43. Sanctions for COBRA Violations Softened by Technical Corrections,
supra note 42, at 3. COBRA's notification requirements, however, are covered
under ERISA, which authorizes the DOL to levy fines of $100 per day per indi-
vidual during the period of noncompliance. Id. COBRA also amended the Pub-
lic Health Service Act to authorize lawsuits forcing group health plans to
comply with the law. See Kennedy, supra note 41, at 260.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(B) (1993).
45. COBRA GumE, supra note 21,912630. See infra note 118 and accompa-
nying text (discussing a possible reason for Congress's failure to define gross
misconduct in proposed COBRA regulations).
46. See supra notes 7 (discussing The Health Insurance Portability and
Guaranteed Renewability Act of 1995, a recent proposal to expand COBRA leg-
islation) and 10 (discussing subsequent amendments to the original COBRA
statute).
47. Early interpretations of gross misconduct differed significantly. See
Carol M. Hines, Comment, 'A Modest Proposal" for Defining "Gross Miscon-
duct" for COBRA Coverage Disqualifications, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 463, 475
(1992) (discussing initial interpretations of COBRA's gross misconduct provi-
sion). The ERISA Industry Committee ("ERIC"), a consortium of 125 of the na-
tion's largest employers with employer-sponsored benefit plans, suggested that
employers follow state unemployment policy. Id. ERIC argued that employees
who leave their jobs voluntarily should not qualify for continued coverage. Id.
ERIC also contended that disqualification should be based on misconduct,
rather than gross misconduct. Id. Other commentators argued that Congress
intended "gross misconduct" to mean "almost criminal" conduct. Id.
48. While experts now agree that "gross misconduct" is a severe standard,
they disagree as to when the standard should apply. See COBRA Gums, supra
note 21, 1 15,005 (transcript of an interview conducted with attorneys John J.
Hunter and James F. Podheiser). Hunter and Podheiser argue that employers
should be "quite cautious" in denying coverage on the basis of alleged miscon-
duct. Id. They believe that the misconduct should be egregious by any normal
1995] 207
208 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:197
with serious health problems and large medical bills, the IRS
encourages employers to resolve any doubt over whether an em-
ployee's actions constitute gross misconduct in favor of the
employee.49
1. Legislative History
Legislation providing health coverage for the recently un-
employed did not evolve until the last two decades. Congress
considered proposals that would have established continued
health insurance benefits to unemployed Americans as early as
standards-such as acts of dishonesty, disloyalty to the employer, intoxication,
or use of unauthorized drugs. Id. Furthermore, the conduct should be clearly
contrary to the interests of the employer. Id. See also COBRA GUIDE, supra
note 21, 15,025 (transcript of a July 1994 interview with Roberta Casper Wat-
son, Chair Elect of the ABA Section of Taxation's Employee Benefits Commit-
tee) ("The things that ought to be treated as gross misconduct I think are things
that just about everybody would agree are misconduct. If the conduct is margi-
nal, you probably should not deny COBRA on account of it, even if it is legiti-
mate to terminate the employee."). The definition of gross misconduct
"ultimately rests with each employer." Many Questions Generated at Seminar
on COBRA's Continuation Requirements, Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1305
(July 28, 1986). Some commentators caution that Congress intended to define
gross misconduct as "almost a criminal standard." Id. Selling trade secrets to
another employer probably constitutes gross misconduct. Taking a job with a
competing employer probably does not constitute gross misconduct, even
though it is "not nice." Id.
49. Plan administrators should grant continuation coverage "whenever
possible" because it "usually isn't worth the trouble to litigate." IRS Readying
Operational Projects, Determination Letter Program Guidelines, Pension Rep.
(BNA) No. 42, at 1901 (Oct. 26, 1992) (quoting an IRS branch chief). Most liti-
gated cases involve individuals with severe medical conditions and huge medi-
cal bills, and "courts have tended to be sympathetic to the plaintiffs in these
cases." Id. Many employers do not use the gross misconduct exception because
of a fear of litigation. Employers' Message to IRS: "We Can't Live With COBRA',
Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1463 (Nov. 9, 1987). See also Melanie S. Lapidus
& Laura A. Erbs, Recent COBRA Developments in the Courts, EMPLOYEE BEINE-
Frrs J., June 1992, at 8, 10 ("Employers can expect to be faced with civil law-
suits when claiming the gross misconduct exception and should probably err on
the side of employees in all but the most egregious of cases."). But see infra
notes 77-85 (discussing cases upholding COBRA denials for gross misconduct).
One 1994 survey found that companies denied COBRA coverage based on
gross misconduct to two-tenths of 1% of individuals who elected COBRA. 1994
COBRA Survey, supra note 28, at 6. This statistic confirms the cautious ap-
proach taken by employers; however, it understates the number of individuals
who do not qualify for benefits due to gross misconduct because it only includes
employees who made a formal application for COBRA continuation. Because
employers are not required to offer COBRA continuation to employees termi-
nated for gross misconduct, it is safe to assume that most employees in this
catagory do not make a formal application for coverage. See COBRA GUIDE,
supra note 21, 5290.
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1975.50 In 1983, Congress rejected the Health Care for the Un-
employed Act, which would have established a temporary pro-
gram of health benefits for the unemployed and their families.51
Introduced in the House of Representatives in 1985, the original
COBRA proposal was designed to ensure continued access to
health care insurance for women and children.52 As proposed,
H.R. 21 mandated that employers provide continued health care
coverage to family members of deceased, divorced, separated,
and Medicare-eligible employees for five years from cessation of
employment.53
Influenced by a similar desire to ensure continued access to
health care for women and children,5 4 the Senate version of H.R.
50. See S. REP. No. 76, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. REP. No. 171,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-2 (1975).
51. H.R. 3021, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See H.R. REP. No. 236, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1983) (recommending passage of H.R. 3021, the Health-
care for the Unemployed Act); H.R. REP. No. 236, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2
(1983) (recommending passage of H.R. 3021 with an amendment); S. REP. No.
193, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1983) (reporting on S. 951, Healthcare for Unem-
ployed Workers).
52. 131 CONG. REC. E53 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Rep. Stark)
("Among nearly 100 million full-time and part-time civilian workers nation-
wide, 59 million were covered by their employers' health plans. Yet anywhere
from 49.1 million to 76.7 million Americans under age 65 either lack full-year
insurance or have inadequate policies.... Divorced and widowed women and
their children are particularly vulnerable."). See 131 CONG. REC. H4012 (daily
ed. June 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Burton) (predicting that the health insur-
ance continuation provisions in the house bill would provide affordable health
insurance coverage to a large percentage of the six million widowed and di-
vorced women typically unable to obtain health insurance); BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 118-19 (1994) (providing state-by-state and other statistical information
on the number of uninsured Americans).
53. H.R. REP. No. 451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 563 (1985). See 131 CONG.
REC. H4012 (daily ed. June 6, 1985) (describing basic provisions of H.R. 21 as
proposed by Representatives Stark and Clay). Employers that failed to meet
this mandate could not claim a business tax deduction for group health insur-
ance. H.R. EP. No. 451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 562 (1985). See supra note 42
(discussing COBRA's initial non-compliance penalties).
54. Speaking on behalf of the Finance Committee, Senator David
Durenberger noted that the Senate amendment calling for continued health
care benefits began as part of the Economic Equity Act of 1985, which he intro-
duced earlier in the year. 131 CONG. REC. S15648 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985)
(remarks of Sen. Durenberger). He noted that the nation's "new poor" included
women and children who had previously depended on spousal salaries and
fringe benefits. He stated:
Continuity is both a women's issue and a health care access issue.
Health insurance continuity is vital for the spouses and families left
behind by the death of a covered employee or a divorce and for spouses
and families following a termination of employment....
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21 decreased the continuation period from five years to eighteen
months,55 but expanded the pool of qualified beneficiaries to in-
clude three additional groups: employees who voluntarily or in-
voluntarily terminate employment, employees who lose coverage
because of reduced hours, and dependent children who lose cov-
erage because of group plan age limitations.56 While the Senate
bill allowed employers to deny continuation coverage to employ-
ees terminated "for cause,"57 the subsequent conference agree-
ment replaced 'Tor cause" with the narrower exception of "gross
misconduct."58
2. IRS Enforcement Activities
Although the IRS issued proposed regulations on many as-
pects of COBRA administration in June 1987,59 it has not de-
fined gross misconduct and will not issue private letter rulings
Currently 6 million widows and divorced women are unable to ob-
tain any health insurance. Many of those uninsured women held cov-
erage with a spouse at one time, and following a divorce, death or
termination of employment were faced with a handful of undesirable
choices. Some former spouses were able to convert their current health
coverage to a private plan which often did not offer the same coverage
dollar per dollar as the group plan. In addition, often these new non-
group plans did not cover prior existing conditions. Many women went
completely without basic insurance....
Health insurance continuity makes good policy sense on many
fronts; it offers an opportunity for coverage to many who might other-
wise turn to public assistance, and serves to slow the downward spiral
of the feminization of poverty. This provision does not mandate bene-
fits, rather it mandates the opportunity to maintain access to afforda-
ble group health insurance.
Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 564 (1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. See also 131 CONG. REC. H13249 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (noting
that Title VII of the Senate amendment "provides that... employees are quali-
fied beneficiaries upon termination of employment," while Title IX of the Senate
amendment "expands the classes of qualified beneficiaries listed to include em-
ployees whose hours are reduced, resulting in a loss of coverage" but does not
require employers to provide coverage to "employees who are terminated for
cause").
58. H.R. REP. No. 451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 564 (1985). See 132 CONG.
REc. H875 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Clay).
59. See 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716-32 (1987) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)(proposed June 15, 1987); see also IRS Charms COBRA Rules Out; Employers
Have 3 Months to Comply, SPENcEr's REs. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs, June
19, 1987, at 1 (noting that employers may safely rely on the notice of proposed
rulemaking published by the IRS).
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on whether a specific action constitutes gross misconduct.60 The
Internal Revenue Code penalizes employers that fail to comply
with COBRA's continuation provisions, but does not provide any
remedy for individuals who do not receive benefits. 61 Instead,
the IRS refers individuals who dispute COBRA gross miscon-
duct denials to the DOL. 62 The DOL provides information on
benefit entitlement and on how to obtain benefits, and will con-
tact an employer on behalf of an individual to remind the em-
ployer of its COBRA responsibilities. 63  While COBRA
empowers the DOL to initiate a civil action to enforce the law,
the DOL will not institute such an enforcement action unless
the employer denies benefits to more than one individual. 64 A
study by the General Accounting Office ("GAO") in 1991 con-
cluded that the IRS's method of dealing with potential COBRA
beneficiaries "discourages the reporting of violations."65 For ex-
ample, during the period of the study, from June 1989 to July
1990, the DOL initiated enforcement action against only two
employers, while the IRS national office received more than one
hundred allegations of noncompliance, and thousands of
inquiries.66
60. Rev. Proc. 87-28, 1987-1 C.B. 770. See IRS Will Issue Private Rulings
on Some COBRA Issues; Model Language to Come, SPENCER'S RES. REP. ON EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS, June 19, 1987, at 3. A letter ruling is a written statement
issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies the tax laws to the taxpayer's
specific situation. Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 13. See also Employers, Practi-
tioners Await Regulatory Guidance on Unresolved Issues, Pension Rep. (BNA)
No. 12, at 498 (Mar. 23, 1992) (suggesting that the biggest hurdle in issuing
guidance could be the fact that COBRA is a "mixed policy bag" that uses a reve-
nue collecting agency-the IRS-to enforce health and social policy).
61. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing penalties for
COBRA violations).
62. See IRS, DOL Not Helpful to COBRA Beneficiaries, GAO Report Indi-
cates, SPENcER'S REs. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Mar. 1, 1991, at 3 (report-




66. Id. The IRS refers allegations to district offices, which decide whether
to pursue a particular case and possibly impose tax penalties. Id. According to
the GAO, the IRS started action on only five of more than 100 complaints and
completed only one examination. Id. See also IRS, DOL Must Improve Enforce-
ment of COBRA Benefit Requirements, GAO Says, Pensions & Benefits Daily
(BNA), Jan. 11, 1991, at 1 (discussing GAO report).
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3. Gross Misconduct for Federal Employees
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Amendments Act of
1988 ("FEHBAA), 67 extends continuation coverage benefits to
federal employees, 68 a group left uncovered under COBRA. 69
FEHBAA's continuation provision also excludes employees ter-
minated for gross misconduct.70 The Office of Personnel Man-
agement ("OPM"), which oversees FEHBAA, defined gross
misconduct in regulations issued in 1989, just one year after
FEKBAA's enactment.7 1 For purposes of determining a federal
employee's eligibility for FEHBAA continuation benefits, the
OPM defines gross misconduct as "a flagrant and extreme trans-
gression of law or established rule of action for which an em-
ployee is separated and concerning which a judicial or
administrative finding of gross misconduct has been made."7 2
H1. CURRENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
COBRA'S "GROSS MISCONDUCT" PROVISION
Because COBRA and its accompanying regulations do not
define gross misconduct, courts are left to define the term. Case
law suggests that courts have developed their own definitions of
67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1988).
68. FEHBAA offers continued health coverage to terminated federal em-
ployees, certain unmarried dependent children, and others covered under a
health benefits plan as a member of the family of a federal employee. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8905a(b) (1988).
69. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA's
statutory requirements).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 8905a(b)(1)(A) (1988).
71. See Federal Employees Health Benefit Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890.1102
(1992).
72. Id. Based on the legal understanding of the term "gross misconduct,"
the FEHBAA definition includes felonies and possibly lesser criminal offenses.
54 Fed. Reg. 52,333 (1989). The OPM bases determinations on the gravity of
the offense, the relationship between the offense and the employee's job, the
employee's understanding of the gravity of his or her actions, and whether the
offense was "affirmative and willful" rather than "simply negligent." Id. The
OPM also outlines specific procedures that employers must follow when deny-
ing continuation benefits for gross misconduct. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.1112(a)-(d)
(1992). The office must give the employee a reasonable time to respond orally or
in writing, and allow the employee to be represented by an attorney or other
representative. Id. The agency must designate an officer who has the authority
either to make or recommend a final decision on the denial to hear the em-
ployee's oral answer. Id. After an employee responds to the notice of denial,
the employing office must issue its final decision in writing and fully set forth
its findings and conclusions. Id. See generally Hines, supra note 47, at 491-92,
499-500 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of using FEHBAA's defini-
tion of gross misconduct to determine gross misconduct under COBRA).
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gross misconduct,7 3 adopted definitions used in analogous state
unemployment insurance law,74 embraced a federal "near crimi-
nal" definition, 75 or turned to COBRA's legislative history.7 6
A. DEVIATION FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF MANAGERIAL
CONDUCT
Some courts have interpreted the gross misconduct provi-
sion in terms of acceptable standards of managerial conduct. In
Avina v. Texas Pig Stands Inc.,77 an employer denied COBRA
continuation coverage to an employee based on cash handling
irregularities, invoice irregularities, and failure to improve the
performance of a store under his management.78 In analyzing
the employee's claim to COBRA continuation benefits, the Avina
court defined gross misconduct as "substantial deviation from
the high standards and obligations of a managerial employee
that would indicate that said employee cannot be entrusted with
his management duties without danger to the employer."7 9 The
court determined that the employee's conduct met this defini-
tion, and upheld the employer's decision to deny COBRA
benefits.80
The Avina definition appears in a number of subsequent
COBRA cases. For example, Karby v. Standard Products Co.81
upheld a COBRA denial where an employee paid exorbitant
prices to a supplier in which he had a financial interest.8 2 The
employee also accepted numerous favors from other suppliers,
allowing one supplier to pay his mortgage for two years, 83 and
73. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing decisions ap-
plying the gross misconduct definition set forth in Avina).
74. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that
borrow definitions of gross misconduct from state unemployment insurance
law).
75. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing decisions
that focus on the criminal nature of the employee's conduct).
76. See infra notes 103-113 (discussing decisions based on COBRA's legis-
lative history).
77. No. SA-88-CA-13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1,
1991).
78. Id. at *2. The employee was a district manager, a position which "re-
quired a high degree of trust and confidence." Id.
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id.
81. CIV. A. No. 3:90-2918-17, 1992 WL 333931 (D.S.C. June 22, 1992).
82. Id. at *6.
83. Id. at *3.
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accepting an interest-free loan from another.8 4 Most recently, a
district court used the Avina definition of gross misconduct to
uphold a COBRA denial where an employer dismissed an em-
ployee for unauthorized use of a corporate credit card and for
misrepresenting the status of a customer account to the Small
Business Administration.8 5
B. DEFINITIONS OF MISCONDUCT FROM STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE
Other courts have applied definitions of gross misconduct
from seemingly analogous state unemployment insurance laws.
Like COBRA, these laws provide benefits to employees who ex-
perience sudden and unexpected job loss, and typically deny
benefits to employees who are discharged for misconduct.8 6 In
Paris v. F. Korbel & Brothers, Inc.,8 7 the court looked to the defi-
nition of misconduct under California's unemployment insur-
ance law to determine that an employer improperly denied
COBRA continuation to an employee for breaching a company
policy.88 The employee, a waitress in the company's executive
dining room, knowingly violated the company's confidentiality
policy when she told the wife of a co-worker that she overheard a
84. Id. The company also accused the employee of theft for installing a
$1,700 sprinkler system in his yard at company expense. Id.
85. See Johnson v. Shawmut Natl Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-12919-RGS, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 1994). The employee was a vice-presi-
dent of special loan services, and handled workout situations for commercial
loans. Id. at *2. A commercial loan customer had defaulted on some of its loan
payments and forwarded approximately 26 monthly payments to the employee
over a two-year period as part of a workout agreement. Id. Instead of forward-
ing the checks for processing, the employee kept them in his desk drawer and
intentionally misinformed the Small Business Administration that the mort-
gage was in default. Id. He also admitted to using his corporate credit card for
personal expenses, in knowing violation of bank policy. Id. at "3. The company
terminated him and immediately notified him by letter that he was not eligible
for COBRA continuation. Id.
86. Hines, supra note 47, at 481 (discussing the similarity of purpose be-
tween unemployment insurance benefits and COBRA continuation benefits).
There is, however, one important distinction between COBRA and state unem-
ployment insurance laws: state unemployment law is only available to employ-
ees "who become unemployed through no fault of their own," while COBRA
covers "voluntarily terminated and most involuntarily terminated employees
and their qualified beneficiaries." Id. at 481-82. Further, although both pro-
grams exclude employees discharged for misconduct, courts appear to construe
state unemployment laws more liberally to shield employees from the harsh
economic consequences resulting from involuntary unemployment. Id.
87. 751 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
88. Id. at 838.
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group of executives discussing the co-worker's request to shift to
part-time employment status.8 9
Courts that define gross misconduct by looking to state un-
employment insurance law may find it easier to rule in favor of
employee plaintiffs who face large medical bills. This approach,
however, still gives courts room to deny COBRA continuation
coverage in cases of serious misconduct. Just two years after its
decision in Paris, the court in Adkins v. United International In-
vestigative Services, Inc.,90 borrowed the definition of gross mis-
conduct from state unemployment law to hold that an employer
justifiably denied benefits to an employee who deserted his
guard post, falsified a duty log to collect an unearned paycheck,
and failed to tell the employer why he left his previous job.9 '
Unlike the Paris court, which may have been swayed by the fact
that the employee incurred substantial medical bills after her
termination, the Adkins court focused on the seriousness of the
employee's misconduct rather than on the seriousness of his
medical condition and the fact that his injuries occurred shortly
after he was terminated.9 2
C. CRIMnNAL OR "NEAR-CRumA" CONDUCT
The different results in Paris and Adkins reflect another
trend in judicial interpretation of COBRA's gross misconduct
provision. Rather than turning to state unemployment insur-
ance law, a number of courts and commentators focus on the se-
verity of the alleged misconduct and deny COBRA continuation
89. Id. at 835-36. The co-worker, angry that his manager had discussed the
request with other executives, complained and the company fired the employee.
Id. at 836. Because the co-worker was a company pilot, the company argued
that the employee was guilty of gross misconduct because her actions upset the
pilot, thus endangering the lives of the executives who traveled on the company
plane. Id. The employee's son required medical treatment shortly after her em-
ployment ended; neither the employee nor her husband had medical insurance
at that time. Id.
90. No. C 91-0087 BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4719 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27,
1992).
91. The employee, a security guard, deserted his post and was found asleep
at his home; he was the only guard on duty that day. Id. at *1. He also falsified
the duty log to show that a second guard was also on duty that day. He later
admitted to falsifying the log to collect a second, unearned paycheck. Id.
92. Within two weeks of his termination, the employee suffered severe
blockage of his coronary arteries, underwent heart bypass surgery, and ulti-
mately incurred $94,764.15 in medical expenses. Id. at *3.
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only when the employee's behavior is criminal or "near
criminal."93
The most complete discussion of the "near criminal" stan-
dard appears in Burke v. American Stores Employee Benefit
Plan.94 In Burke, the court upheld a COBRA gross misconduct
denial where a supermarket employee stole coupons and re-
deemed them for free turkeys.95 The court likened the em-
ployee's conduct to theft of employer property and concluded
that the employee's conduct would constitute gross misconduct if
her employer established that she knew the coupons "had been
obtained by unauthorized means."96 The Burke court relied on
Illinois's own unemployment insurance statute, which denies
benefits to employees discharged because of theft in connection
with their work.97 Noting that it may be "inappropriate" to in-
terpret COBRA's gross misconduct provision solely in terms of
state law, the Burke court nevertheless stated that the "policies
promoted by state law may also be legitimate considerations for
93. See Conery v. Bath Assocs., 803 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding
that an employee's misappropriation of company funds constituted misconduct).
The Conery court specifically noted that the employer need not prove criminal
conduct, thus making it possible to impose severe sanctions on employees who
are accused, but not convicted, of criminal conduct. Id. at 1396.
94. 818 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. IM. 1993).
95. Id. at 1138. After the employee prepared a signed statement confessing
to the theft, a company manager determined that her termination was due to
"gross misconduct," id. at 1133, and the company denied her COBRA continua-
tion. Id. at 1134. Several months later, she was injured in a fall and incurred
more than $150,000 in medical fees. Id. at 1134. Prior to being fired, she had
filed a workers' compensation claim and was receiving medical care for certain
physical ailments. Id. The manager knew of the pending workers' compensa-
tion claim when she discharged the employee. Id. The court focused on the
alleged misconduct, and held that the employer acted "properly and reasonably"
in deciding to fire her and deny COBRA continuation coverage. Id. at 1138.
The court stated that its decision furthered "the need to encourage employee
honesty" by denying COBRA benefits to employees who steal from their employ-
ers. Id. at 1136. The court also stated that the inquiry into the propriety of an
employer's gross misconduct determination should be limited to the evidence
available to the employer at the time of the employee's discharge. Id. at 1137.
Under this approach, the court refused to serve as a "super personnel depart-
ment" charged with second-guessing employment decisions based on informa-
tion not available to the employer. Id. See generally Robert M. Hogg, Note, The
Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits Litigation After Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MwN. L. Ray. 1575, 1584-89 (1994) (not-
ing that federal circuit courts of appeal follow three separate rules when
presented with evidence not previously presented to a plan administrator).
96. Burke, 818 F. Supp. at 1136.
97. Id. at 1135.
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a federal court which is seeking to apply the federal common law
on a uniform basis nationwide."98
Recently, a court turned to a growing body of federal case
law to further refine the Burke court's analysis. In Collins v.
Aggreko, Inc.,99 an employer terminated an employee for his in-
volvement in a traffic accident while operating a company vehi-
cle under the influence of alcohol. 100 Arguing that the
employee's actions did not constitute gross misconduct because
his actions were not intentional, the employee's wife and minor
daughter moved for a temporary restraining order and a prelim-
inary injunction preventing the former employer from denying
their right to continued health coverage under COBRA.10' Cit-
ing Burke's concern that courts interpret the gross misconduct
exception in light of federal law and not solely state law, the
court determined that "Igiross misconduct may be intentional,
wanton, willful, deliberate, reckless or in deliberate indifference
to an employer's interest .... It is misconduct beyond mere mi-
nor breaches of employee standards, but conduct that would be
considered gross in nature." 0 2
98. Id. At 1136. The court reasoned that Illinois's effort to discourage em-
ployee theft and encourage employee honesty "is a public policy which should be
applied nationwide;" therefore, withholding COBRA benefits to employees who
steal from their employers furthers the national application of that policy. Id.
99. 884 F. Supp. 450 (D. Utah 1995).
100. Id. at 452.
101. Id. at 452-54. Collins is the second case in which a COBRA beneficiary
petitioned a court for a preliminary injunction to prevent an employer from de-
nying COBRA continuation coverage. See Cabral v. Olsten Corp., 843 F. Supp.
701, 704 (1994) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing an employer from
denying COBRA continuation coverage to a seriously ill employee who was ter-
minated for alleged gross misconduct); supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text
and infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of
Cabral).
102. Id. at 453-54. The court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to
show irreparable harm, and therefore failed to meet the requirements for issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 454. The court distinguished Cabral
and other cases in which courts had granted injunctive relief on the rationale
that a lack of health insurance may involve irreparable injury. The court noted
that in Cabral, "the plaintiff suffered from breast cancer, obviously a serious
and potentially economically devastating medical and personal situation." Id.
In addition, Cabral had no other insurance and was uninsurable, while the
other cases cited in Cabral involved termination of benefits for union employees
and their families. Id. In contrast, the Collins' claim involved denial of cover-
age based on a pre-existing condition-Mrs. Collins' pregnancy. Id. While the
Collins had health insurance through Mr. Collins' new employer, they paid all
costs associated with the pregnancy because their new health insurance did not
cover preexisting conditions. Id. Their ineligibility for COBRA continuation




D. DETERMINATIONS BASED ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because COBRA's gross misconduct provision is textually
ambiguous, courts have used COBRA's legislative history and
purpose to infer that COBRA's gross misconduct exception
should not apply to family members. In MIsna v. Unitel Com-
munications, Inc.,10 3 the plaintiff incurred substantial medical
bills after her husband quit his job. She subsequently filed an
action against her husband's former employer, claiming that the
employer violated COBRA's notice requirement.10 4 The com-
pany filed a third-party complaint against the plaintiff's hus-
band, claiming that it had terminated him for gross misconduct;
therefore, neither he nor his wife was eligible for COBRA contin-
uation.10 5 Before determining that the employee had, in fact,
resigned, the district court looked to COBRA's legislative pur-
pose and noted that alleged gross misconduct leading to termi-
nation does not excuse an employer's duty to provide eligible
family members with proper COBRA notification.10 6
The appeals court, over a dissent, disagreed with the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the employer was duty-bound to no-
tify the plaintiff even if her husband had been fired for gross
misconduct, noting that "[wle cannot look to legislative history
to demand more of employers than Congress has seen fit to re-
quire."107 The appeals court also held that the employee's resig-
nation with notice was not a qualifying event under COBRA,
and remanded the case to the district court to determine when
and under what circumstances the employee left work and
103. 825 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. 1. 1993), rev'd, 41 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1994).
104. Id. at 863-64.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 865.
107. 41 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1994). Concurring in part and dissenting
in part, Circuit Judge Cudahy disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
statute does not require employers to notify the spouse and children of an em-
ployee who is terminated for gross misconduct. Id. at 1131. Noting that the
statute's plain language does not determine whether an employer must notify a
spouse, Cudahy concluded that it "conceives of spouses as people in their own
right" and therefore provides for independent notice to spouses. Id. "The fact
that a different section of the statute... abrogates COBRA's obligations if an
employee has grossly misbehaved seems not to answer concerns about his
spouse's rights. Nor, for that matter, does it consider the plight of the depen-
dents of that spouse." Id. Cudahy compared the majority's approach to the
common law doctrine of coverture, "which refused to recognize a married wo-
man's independent legal existence." Id. at 1131 n1 (citing I WiLLmm BLACK-
STONE, COMMNT nmS ON TH LAW OF ENGLAND 430-33 (1786) and KERMIT L.
HALL, THE MAGIC MMIROR 35-37 (1989)). But see supra notes 7, 51-59 (discuss-
ing COBRA's purpose and legislative history).
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whether a qualifying event occurred.108 By holding that an em-
ployee's resignation with notice does not constitute a qualifying
event under COBRA, the case arguably allows employers to fire
employees for gross misconduct after they resign, potentially
jeopardizing the employee's right to COBRA continuation
benefits. 0 9
COBRA's legislative history also played an important role
in Cabral v. Olsten Corp.,110 a case involving a seriously ill em-
ployee terminated for gross misconduct. In granting a prelimi-
nary injunction preventing the employer from denying COBRA
continuation, the district court cited M/sna and stated that Con-
gress did not intend that an employee's alleged gross misconduct
affect a family member's right to COBRA continuation. 11 The
holding in Cabral is at odds with COBRA's statutory text;112 yet,
when interpreted in a broader context, it shows that courts have
considerable latitude, not only in defining gross misconduct, but
also in determining whether to apply the gross misconduct
exception.' 13
III. A PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATING COBRA'S GROSS
MISCONDUCT EXCEPTION
COBRA is a federal statute designed to ensure that employ-
ees and family members have continued access to employer-
sponsored health care benefits. United States district courts,
108. Misna, 41 F.3d at 1128.
109. See id. at 1128-29 (recognizing the potential for abuse by employers,
but finding potential sanctions adequate to deter any wrongdoing).
110. 843 F. Supp. 701, 702 (M.D. Fla. 1994). See supra notes 1-6 (discussing
the facts and holding of Cabral).
111. "Congress enacted COBRA as a remedial statute to provide insurance
coverage to terminated employees and their families or to the employee's
spouse and dependents regardless of the circumstances of the employee's termi-
nation." Id. at 704 (citing Mlsna v. Unitel Communications, Inc., 825 F. Supp.
862, 864 (N.D. M]1. 1993)).
112. See COBRA GuIDE, supra note 21, 15,025 (transcript of interview
with Roberta Casper Watson) ("The statute provides that COBRA coverage is
simply not provided in the case of a termination for gross misconduct.... There
is simply no basis in the statute for anybody to say that the family gets COBRA
even when the employee does not.").
113. A typical argument for not applying the gross misconduct exception is
based on the following reasoning: Congress created the COBRA statute to pro-
vide coverage to employees and their family members who lose health care cov-
erage due to unforeseen changes in employment or family status. When an
employee is terminated for alleged gross misconduct, he or she loses coverage
because of an unforeseen change in employment. Denying COBRA continua-
tion to these employees and their family members thus thwarts the basic intent
and purpose of the COBRA statute.
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however, have constructed a fragmented and inconsistent body
of law by interpreting COBRA's ambiguous gross misconduct
provision using four distinct sources: case-by-case assessments
of what constitutes a "substantial deviation from managerial
conduct," analogous state unemployment insurance laws, an
emerging federal standard of "near criminal" conduct based on
case law, and COBRA's legislative history. The resulting deci-
sions provide little guidance to employers and health plan
administrators.
A. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Because enacting legislators expanded the pool of potential
beneficiaries while insisting upon the stringent standard of
"gross misconduct," COBRA's evolution in Congress suggests
that employers should deny COBRA continuation benefits only
when employees are terminated for very serious transgres-
sions. 114 The most common explanation for the gross miscon-
duct exception posits that legislators thought it would rarely be
achieved, and included it merely to appease a particular sena-
tor.115 Accompanying legislative history supports this theory,
suggesting that as a seemingly small part of the Comprehensive
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985,116 COBRA's continuation
114. One commentator has noted that the final version of COBRA "was very
different from the original concept, which was to provide protection to women
and dependent children," and that as the "potential number of covered individu-
als was thus enlarged under the final version of COBRA, the provision allowing
employers to disqualify certain involuntarily terminated employees was nar-
rowed." Hines, supra note 47, at 469.
115. Be Sure that Gross Misconduct is Serious Enough When Using the
Gross Misconduct Exception, Expert Advises, COBRA Guide Connections (CCH)
No. 18, at 2 (Aug. 25, 1994).
116. See 131 CONG. REc. H9499 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1985) (remarks of Rep.
Stark) ("Finally, H.R. 3128 calls for two small but significant proposals to help
the uninsured .... [S]ome 5 million women could benefit from the provision
that will allow widows, divorced and separated spouses,... and the dependents




provisions were at best, hastily assembled, 117 and at worst, care-
lessly drafted and poorly conceived.' 18
1. The "Substantial Deviation" Standard
Although it is applied in a number of COBRA continuation
decisions, the "substantial deviation" standard of misconduct es-
poused in Avina is as vague and imprecise as the exception it
purports to define."19 District courts must determine what con-
117. See 132 CONG. REc. H881 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1986) (remarks of Rep.
Roukema) (The ERISA provisions, although solely within the jurisdiction of
the Committee on Education and Labor, were added to the legislation under
exceptional circumstances and are deserving of further congressional scrutiny
as to their operation in practice."); see also Health Care Continuation Measures
Establish Permanent Federal Presence in What Employers Shall Provide, SPEN-
c's RES. REP. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, June 6, 1986, at 2 (quoting Phyllis
Borzi, a House subcommittee pension counsel, who explained that "[tihere were
no hearings and no separate mark-up on the continuation provisions, which
Congress enacted in order to 'provide access to health care' ").
118. Senator Charles Grassley condemned the procedure followed by the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources in reviewing the reconciliation bill:
Many staff members were absent and could not be reached. Mem-
bers were absent; most were probably out of town. I myself was
reached by my subcommittee staff director only at 10:00 p.m. by phone.
Documentation was initially unavailable for two of the bills in ques-
tion. When documentation was provided, it was, in one case, a long
elaborate bill with many handwritten insertions and strike-outs; some
sections were unnumbered.
S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 489 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.CA.N. 42, 448.
Under the transactional model of the legislative process, political markets
are analogous to economic markets in that both have distinct patterns of supply
and demand. WiLiAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FcRICXEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 53
(1995). The model theorizes that legislators confronted with conflicting de-
mands from constituents face a steady decline in support over time. Id. at 55.
To counteract this problem, legislators must act so that each of the conflicting
groups will "believe it has won." Id. at 56. The best legislative solution is to
"pass an ambiguous bill which delegates policy responsibility to an administra-
tive agency." Id. With its many ambiguous provisions and convoluted regula-
tory scheme, the COBRA statute is an excellent example of the transactional
model in practice. COBRA makes constituents happy because it extends health
insurance coverage to the increasing number of uninsured individuals. At the
same time, the statute makes insurance companies and employers happy (at
least in theory) because the individuals who elect COBRA continuation cover-
age will (at least in theory) bear the full cost. To maintain this delicate balance
of constituent satisfaction, enacting legislators delegated the most challenging
issues-such as what constitutes gross misconduct-to the three agencies
charged with COBRA's enforcement.
119. These decisions are based on Avina v. Texas Pig Stands, Inc., No. SA-
88-Ca-13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1991), which defines
gross misconduct as the "substantial deviation from the high standards and ob-
ligations of a managerial employee that would indicate that said employee can-
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stitutes a "substantial deviation from the high standards and
obligations of a managerial employee" just as they must deter-
mine what constitutes gross misconduct.1 0 Moreover, by focus-
ing solely on managerial employees, the Avina standard implies
that rank and file employees, who are not subject to the same
"high standards and obligations," could not be found guilty of
gross misconduct for similar conduct.121 The definition thus cre-
ates an environment in which employers must impose different
sanctions for the same violation, depending on whether the em-
ployee's job qualifies as "managerial." Congress never intended
for employers to make such distinctions in determining a termi-
nated employee's eligibility for COBRA continuation coverage.
2. State Unemployment Insurance Law
The conflicting holdings in Adkins 122 and Paris123 highlight
the central problem with using state unemployment insurance
laws to determine COBRA eligibility: the approach produces
significantly different outcomes, even when the same district
court decides the cases based on the law of a single state. 24 The
not be entrusted with his management duties without danger to the employer."
Id. at *5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Shawmut Natl Corp., CA. No. 91-12919-RGS,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437 (D. Mass Feb. 8, 1994); Karby v. Standard Prod-
ucts Co., CIV. A. No. 3:90-2918-17, 1992 WL 333931 (D.S.C. June 22, 1992).
See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings of
these cases).
120. Avina, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 at *5. A wide range of employee
conduct can qualify as "gross misconduct" under the Avina definition, including
cash management and performance problems (Avina), accepting loans and gifts
from suppliers (Karby), and unauthorized use of a company credit card and mis-
representing the status of a business to an outside agency (Johnson). While
employers may view this ambiguity as an advantage because it gives them
room to handle unanticipated instances of employee misconduct, it is difficult to
argue that Congress should adopt an equally ambiguous definition of gross mis-
conduct, particularly if the goal is to eliminate the inconsistency and fragmen-
tation which plagues administration of the existing provision.
121. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Avina
definition of gross misconduct). By focusing on the requirement that an em-
ployee meet a loosely defined duty to uphold "managerial" standards, rather
than on the seriousness of the misconduct, the Avina definition of gross miscon-
duct may make it more difficult for employers to deny COBRA continuation
benefits, especially when dealing with individuals who do not qualify as mana-
gerial employees.
122. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
holding of Adkins).
123. See supra notes 87-89 (discussing facts and holding of Paris).
124. Hines, supra note 47, at 481-91 (analyzing problems inherent in using
state unemployment insurance laws to define gross misconduct for purposes of
COBRA administration). Hines notes numerous problems with this approach,
such as: in many states, actions that qualify as misconduct under unemploy-
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potential for inconsistency is even greater when courts in differ-
ent states follow this approach. 25 For example, if the employ-
ment relationship in Paris had occurred in Illinois, the Illinois
court would probably have focused on the deliberate nature of
the employee's decision to violate the company's confidentiality
policy and deny benefits.' 26 If the relationship in Paris had
arisen in Massachusetts, on the other hand, the court would
probably have focused on the employee's lack of intent to harm
the company when she violated the policy, and therefore would
have granted continuation benefits. 127 A Massachusetts court
would thus reach the same result as the California court that
decided the case.
ment insurance laws would not qualify as "gross misconduct7 under COBRA; by
denying benefits to the employee, his or her spouse, and any eligible family
members, COBRA imposes a more severe sanction for a finding of gross miscon-
duct than do most state unemployment insurance laws, which have discretion
to postpone benefits for a certain period, reduce benefits, cancel benefits, or im-
pose some combination of these various sanctions; and, using state unemploy-
ment laws produces significantly different outcomes from state to state. Id.
Despite these problems, Hines suggests that "[alithough the results are varied,
state case law offers useful insight for employers trying to define gross miscon-
duct, at least within the context of a particular state." Id. at 491. But see supra
notes 87-92 (discussing different outcomes reached by courts using the defini-
tion of misconduct from California's unemployment insurance law to determine
an employee's eligibility for COBRA continuation).
125. The court in Collins v. Aggreko, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 450 (D. Utah 1995),
noted:
The problem with looking to state law and state application of the term
gross misconduct is that varied applications and definitions are used
from state. This is not a satisfactory construction of a federal statute
of general application. It does not develop a consistent federal stan-
dard which is what Congress obviously intended.
Id. at 453. See also Hines, supra note 47, at 481-91 (discussing definitions of
misconduct from various state unemployment laws).
126. Illinois defines disqualifying misconduct as the "deliberate and willful"
violation of a reasonable rule or policy. Hines, supra note 47, at 484. See ILL.
AN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 405, § 602(A) (Smith-Hurd 1993). In applying this
definition, Illinois courts have held that misconduct includes submitting 13
false medical claims on behalf of a spouse, lying about a prior felony conviction
on a job application, and failing to contact an employer regarding absences. See
Bandemer v. Department of Employment Sec., 562 N.E.2d 6 (IL. App. Ct. 1990);
Winklmeier v. Board of Review, 450 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Roundtree
v. Board of Review, 281 N.E.2d 360 (I1l. App. Ct. 1972).
127. Massachusetts state unemployment insurance law focuses on how the
conduct affects the employer (rather than the reasonableness of the rule), and
denies benefits when the employee's termination is "attributable solely to delib-
erate misconduct in willful disregard" of the employer. MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
151A, § 25(e)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1992). See Hines, supra note 47, at 486-88 (dis-
cussing Massachusetts unemployment law) and 498-99 (providing a similar ex-
ample using a state unemployment claim).
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3. Uniform Federal "Near Criminal" Standard
At first blush, a uniform federal "near criminal" standard of
gross misconduct appears to provide the ideal solution to the
problems posed by COBRA's ambiguous gross misconduct provi-
sion. The uniform definition suggested by Collins, however,
could make it more difficult for courts to enforce COBRA's gross
misconduct provision because the provision cannot possibly
cover all situations of alleged misconduct. While courts could
try to remedy the gaps in the Collins definition by adding more
detail about the actions that qualify as gross misconduct, doing
so might make the rule so rigid and inflexible that employers
could find themselves foreclosed from denying coverage in many
cases where the employee's actions clearly constitute gross mis-
conduct.1 28 By forcing courts to apply a rigid rule to diverse fact
situations, a more detailed, uniform definition of gross miscon-
duct could lead to even greater inconsistency and judicial
manipulation.
The "near criminal" definition of gross misconduct also im-
poses a severe sanction on an employee without affording the
employee the procedural protections associated with criminal li-
ability.1 29 For example, a prosecutor seeking to convict an em-
ployee accused of theft must prove the employee's guilt "beyond
a reasonable doubt." In contrast, an employer could deny CO-
BRA benefits to the same employee without meeting this high
standard of proof.1 30 Given COBRA's scattered regulatory
scheme, employees have little hope of obtaining adequate assist-
128. In a 1994 interview, Roberta Casper Watson, Chair Elect, ABA Taxa-
tion's Employee Benefits Committee, noted:
If you have detailed examples and something comes in that is
outside one of the examples, that you did not think to put in as an
example, somebody could say "Well, gee, I didn't know this was gross
misconduct." The criminal mind can be very creative about what to do
wrong, so I wouldn't want to foreclose things that could be legitimately
defined as gross misconduct.
Be Sure That Misconduct is Serious Enough When Using the Gross Misconduct
Exception, Expert Advises, COBRA Guide Connections (CCH) No. 18, at 2 (Aug.
25, 1994).
129. See generally SANFORD H. KAnIsH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CammUIAL
LAw AND ITS PROCESSES 39-42 (5th ed. 1988) (discussing fundamental impor-
tance of the Due Process Clause and the reasonable doubt standard).
130. Under the reasonable doubt standard, an individual cannot be con-
victed of a crime unless every element of the crime is proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 39. Although state unemployment insurance laws sometimes
give rise to the same situation, these laws are more closely regulated by state




ance should courts adopt a uniform definition of gross miscon-
duct based on "criminal" or "near criminal" conduct.
Moreover, the "near criminal" definition promulgated in
Collins does not require a showing of intent, meaning that em-
ployers can deny COBRA continuation benefits on the basis of
recklessness or negligence. Enacting legislators would not have
insisted upon substituting the more severe standard of "gross
misconduct" for "cause" if they intended for employers to deny
COBRA continuation benefits upon a showing of reckless or neg-
ligent behavior.131 While Collins correctly holds that gross mis-
conduct must be interpreted in light of federal law, its definition
of gross misconduct is inconsistent with COBRA's plain lan-
guage and its evolution in Congress.
4. COBRA's Legislative History and Purpose
Although highly criticized from a textualist perspective, de-
cisions based on COBRA's legislative history and purpose may
offer the best approach to defining gross misconduct. 132 For ex-
ample, COBRA's legislative history suggests that the M/sna ap-
peals court should not have reversed the district court's
decision. 133 Congress enacted COBRA to ensure that employees
and their family members would not lose health care coverage
due to a sudden and unexpected change in job or marital status.
By ignoring the relevant legislative history and reversing the
district court's conclusion that an employee's termination for
gross misconduct does not affect a family member's right to CO-
BRA continuation benefits, the appeals court's decision in Mlsna
contravenes COBRA's most central purpose.
By holding that resignation with notice does not constitute a
qualifying event under COBRA, the decision makes it easier for
an employer to reduce its liability for large medical claims by
terminating employees for gross misconduct after they submit
resignation notices. The risk of manipulation by employers is
heightened by a recent decision holding that the employer need
not prove actions by the employee that meet criminal stan-
dards. 13 4 The appeals court in M/sna contended that stiff penal-
ties for employers that violate COBRA mandates are sufficient
131. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA's leg-
islative history and the evolution of the gross misconduct exception).
132. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text (discussing decisions
based on COBRA's legislative history).
133. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and holding of M/sna).
134. See supra note 93 (discussing holding of Conery).
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to deter employers from manipulating the gross misconduct ex-
ception. That argument assumes, however, that the government
regulatory agencies charged with COBRA's enforcement vigor-
ously monitor employers' efforts to administer COBRA continua-
tion benefits. Unfortunately, COBRA's fragmented regulatory
scheme provides only limited assistance to individuals who be-
lieve they were incorrectly denied COBRA continuation. 135 In
light of the low number of official investigations into alleged CO-
BRA violations, it is disingenuous to argue that COBRA's non-
compliance penalties serve as a deterrent.
Cabral, in contrast, defines gross misconduct in light of CO-
BRA's legislative history and purpose. 136 Using this approach,
the court correctly granted the employee's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction and prevented the employer from denying CO-
BRA continuation until the case was decided on the merits.
Because the court prevented the employer from denying benefits
until the case was tried on the merits, Cabral is the best exam-
ple of what Congress intended when it drafted COBRA's gross
misconduct exception.
B. GRoss MISCONDUCT: THE CASE FOR A NARROW AND
SEVERE STANDARD
Viewed individually, cases involving COBRA continuation
denials illustrate the flaws inherent in current judicial interpre-
tations of the phrase "gross misconduct." Viewed collectively,
the decisions point to a compelling need for a definition that sets
a severe and narrow standard, ensuring that employees receive
sufficient procedural protections and that employers provide
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is difficult to justify COBRA denials in cases such as Paris
and Cabral, where employers attempted to deny COBRA contin-
uation on the basis of a broad definition of gross misconduct and
a low standard of proof. It is easier, however, to justify denials
in cases involving criminal conduct which an employer proves
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Burke,13 7 for example, the em-
ployee signed a confession at the time of her termination in
which she admitted stealing store coupons and redeeming them
135. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA's
scattered regulatory scheme) and notes 59-66 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing IRS enforcement activities).
136. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
holding of Cabral).




for free turkeys, making it unlikely that her employer termi-
nated her solely to avoid paying subsequent medical claims. In
Adkins,138 the employee lied on his job application and fraudu-
lently accepted an unearned paycheck, making it hard to argue
that his employer terminated him solely to avoid paying for his
subsequent heart surgery.
Employer allegations in other cases were more tenuous.
Although the employer's claims of a falsified mileage report in
Cabral'3 9 would establish the employee's gross misconduct if
true, the court questioned the validity of the employer's allega-
tions, suggesting that the company terminated Ms. Cabral solely
to avoid paying her COBRA claim. While employee misconduct
was clearly documented in Paris,140 the employee's alleged mis-
conduct-discussing a conversation that she overheard while
serving lunch in the company executive dining area-hardly
qualifies as criminal or even "near-criminal" conduct. In deter-
mining that the employee's actions did not rise to the level of
gross misconduct, the court recognized this distinction, despite
the fact that it relied, perhaps erroneously, on California state
unemployment insurance law.
In the absence of congressional action, courts should look to
COBRA's legislative purpose and construe its "gross miscon-
duct" provision narrowly. Courts should uphold COBRA denials
only when employees are found guilty of serious criminal trans-
gressions, such as theft or fraud. COBRA continuation benefits
should be extended to employees accused of criminal conduct but
found not guilty, or accused of less serious misconduct, such as
performance problems or non-criminal violations of company
policies (e.g., being late for work).
This approach ensures that employees will receive adequate
procedural protections before employers deny federally man-
dated COBRA benefits.14 ' Unlike current interpretations of CO-
138. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
holding of Adkins).
139. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
holding of Cabral).
140. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
holding of Paris).
141. This definition is similar, but not identical, to the gross misconduct def-
inition adopted by the Office of Personnel Management in administering
FEHIBAA. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing FEHBAA's
definition of gross misconduct). Under FEHBAA, employers cannot deny fed-
eral continuation coverage unless the employee is found guilty of such miscon-
duct in an administrative or judicial hearing. Under the approach proposed by
this Note, employers could not deny COBRA continuation coverage unless the
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BRA's gross misconduct exception, which let employers deny
benefits under the assumption that employees are guilty until
proven innocent, this approach assumes that employees are in-
nocent-and eligible for COBRA continuation benefits-until
proven guilty. Rather than worrying that "bad" employees
might qualify for COBRA continuation coverage, courts should
ensure that employers, in an effort to avoid paying large medical
claims, cannot deny COBRA continuation benefits to qualified
beneficiaries. To meet this objective, courts should adopt a re-
strictive definition of gross misconduct and require that employ-
ers establish disqualifying conduct beyond a reasonable doubt
before denying benefits.
C. TIM CASE FOR ELIMINATING COBRA's GRoss MISCONDUCT
EXCEPTION
Given the problems posed by inconsistent interpretations of
gross misconduct under COBRA, Congress should eliminate the
gross misconduct exception entirely. The application of CO-
BRA's gross misconduct exception contradicts legislative intent
and purpose, 142 allowing employers to deny health care benefits
to individuals who are in the worst position to find alternative
coverage. Moreover, the Cabral case suggests that the exception
allows employers to make allegations of gross misconduct to
avoid paying benefits for catastrophic illnesses.1 4
3
Eliminating COBRA's gross misconduct provision should
also reduce the problems of implementation and enforcement
employee is found guilty of criminal misconduct in a judicial proceeding. But
see Hines, supra note 47, at 503 (proposing that Congress amend COBRA's stat-
utory language to define gross misconduct as a violation of the law or a "reason-
able" workplace rule). Unlike Hines's proposal, which calls for a uniform
statutory definition of gross misconduct, this Note argues that courts should
apply a more severe criminal standard only until Congress eliminates the gross
misconduct exception entirely.
142. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (outlining COBRA's leg-
islative history).
143. In Cabral v. Olsten Corp., for example, the employer terminated the
employee after she had undergone expensive treatments for breast cancer. 843
F. Supp. 701, 702 (M.D. Fla. 1994). The court granted an injunction preventing
the employer from denying COBRA continuation. Id. See supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Cabral). Although par-
ticipants are responsible for paying the full cost of coverage, sponsoring employ-
ers must pay the difference when claim costs exceed collected premiums. This
funding mechanism may provide additional incentive for employers to use the
gross misconduct exception to keep seriously ill employees from receiving CO-




that make it difficult for employees to dispute denials.' 44 The
IRS has consistently failed to define gross misconduct in both
general regulations or private letter rulings to individual em-
ployers. Enforcement problems are magnified because the IRS
does not provide remedies for individuals denied coverage, and
the DOL takes action only if an employer denies COBRA bene-
fits to more than one individual. An individual must actually
sue his former employer to contest a COBRA denial-a time-
consuming and expensive process that may deter seriously ill
employees from taking action.
Eliminating COBRA's gross misconduct provision would
simplify the administrative process, making it easier for employ-
ers to monitor premium collection and determine the eligibility
of qualified beneficiaries. While many employers worry that
eliminating COBRA's gross misconduct provision will increase
COBRA's funding problems, employers are unlikely to see a dra-
matic increase in the number of COBRA beneficiaries or in the
cost of continuation coverage. 145 Only a small percentage of un-
employed workers elect COBRA continuation.146 These individ-
uals pay 102% of the cost of continuation coverage. Although
many employers have had funding problems, these problems
should be addressed directly, rather than indirectly through de-
nial of coverage to seriously ill employees. 147
Employers raise an ideological objection to eliminating CO-
BRA's gross misconduct provision, stating that it is unfair to
mandate costly benefits in cases of gross misconduct. This argu-
ment ignores several important considerations. Congress en-
acted COBRA to protect employees and their families from
sudden and unexpected changes in employment. It is difficult to
imagine a more sudden or unexpected change in employment
than being fired for alleged gross misconduct. Moreover, CO-
BRA's legislative history indicates that Congress envisioned a
standard of misconduct so severe that few, if any, employees
would be denied benefits on that basis. To adopt a lesser stan-
dard is also inconsistent with established policies and programs,
144. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory
and enforcement procedures).
145. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA's
funding mechanism).
146. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing COBRA enroll-
ment rates).
147. For example, employers could follow a common practice in worker's




such as unemployment insurance and workers compensation,
that extend benefits to fired employees.
CONCLUSION
Enacting legislators envisioned "gross misconduct" as a
transgression so severe that few, if any, employees would be de-
nied benefits on that basis. District courts, however, have
adopted definitions of gross misconduct that let employers deny
COBRA continuation in less serious cases of misconduct. This
inconsistency in interpretation results in radically different out-
comes under the statute from state to state. Those who dispute
COBRA denials receive little assistance from the IRS and DOL;
despite the high cost, it may be easier to litigate disputes than to
work through enforcement agencies.
As escalating health care costs force employers to reduce or
eliminate benefit plans, employees have fewer, more expensive
avenues for health insurance coverage. Although COBRA is
designed to expand access to health insurance coverage, its
gross misconduct exception lets employers manipulate employee
terminations to deny coverage, thereby thwarting the statute's
essential purpose. In the absence of congressional action, courts
should adopt a strict definition of gross misconduct which en-
sures adequate procedural protections. Better yet, Congress
should give effect to COBRA's original legislative intent by elim-
inating this ambiguous provision.
[Vol. 80:197230
